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A B S T R A C T
We examine trends in investment in personnel in Belarussian enterprises and the impact they have on
companies’ capacity to attract FDI and modernise. Others have argued in favour of the economy’s robust
fundamentals, using macro-level data. They have suggested that Belarussian industry has attracted
considerable FDI, due in part to high investment in human capital. Our ﬁndings, based on micro-level
data from Belarussian enterprises in 2009–2014, demonstrate that investments in personnel have
decreased since the global ﬁnancial crisis and are suboptimal, reducing industry’s capacity to attract and
retain FDI. Management has limited ability and inclination to address these problems, due to
government pressure. We conclude that the model may be becoming less sustainable as a result.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Business Review
jo u rn al h om epag e: ww w.els evier .c o m/lo cat e/ ibu s rev1. Introduction
Belarus presents a speciﬁc developmental model on the
transitional periphery because of its rejection of neo-liberal ideas
and policy of maintaining jobs. We examine developments in
investment at enterprise level which indicate that the model’s
long-term sustainability is questionable. Government attempts to
maintain a recognisably Soviet model have been documented
(Danilovich & Croucher, 2011). Belarus has a very low level of
privatized industry, the state is involved in many commercial
transactions, private property rights are only weakly protected,
very high levels of government control exist over investment and
ﬁnance, and corruption is widespread (Pastore & Verashchagina,
2006). Regulation is more arbitrary and unpredictable than in
neighbouring Ukraine, since President Lukashenko rules by decree.
Nonetheless, until the world ﬁnancial crisis hit state ﬁnances,
Belarus had a degree of success in comparison to its neighbour
Ukraine even before Eastern Ukraine became a war zone. It has
preserved a substantial industrial base and a solid educational
system. Its average nominal wage in 2013 was $564.2 (compared
to $408.5 in Ukraine and $291.9 in Moldova). Belarus has the
lowest percentage of people below the poverty line when
compared with Ukraine and Moldova (5.5%, 9.1% and 16.6%
respectively, data for 2012, National Statistical Committee of the
Republic of Belarus, 2014a: 66–72). Russia remains a major and* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: h.danilovich@mdx.ac.uk (H. Danilovich).
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4.0/).supportive trading partner. Recently Belarus joined the Eurasian
Economic Union formed by Russia and Kazakhstan, seeking to
extend long-standing economic cooperation (Blockmans & Kos-
tanyan, 2012).
The state’s major role in the economy has consequences for
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Industry and agriculture remain
heavily subsidized,1 partially in order to maintain employment
(0.6% unemployment in 2013 according to the Belarussian
Statistical Committee). The overwhelming majority of large- and
medium-sized companies are controlled by the state either
through direct ownership or shareholding, with government
shares reaching 99% in some companies. Private enterprises are
concentrated mostly in trade and services and contribute
approximately 25% of GDP (Lavrinkevich, 2014). Companies
pursue the government’s goal of the ‘social state’ by preserving
jobs. The government pushes companies to attract FDI but also
imposes certain social conditions, such as the compulsory
involvement in negotiations of the kontcern, a state industrial
conglomerate, which controls FDI inﬂow and investment condi-
tions. This system appears relatively unattractive to foreign
investors. In 2013 the overall inﬂow of FDI into former Soviet
economies increased by 28% compared to 2012 (from $80.65 mln
to $103.24 mln). Belarus’s share in the total amount was modest
($1.46 mln in 2012 and $2.23 mln in 2013), with the total value of1 The government recently announced cuts in direct subsidies for the majority of
enterprises. Direct money injections will now be replaced by preferential access to
markets, increased export protectionism and intensiﬁed import substitution to
reduce the enormous stock of ﬁnished products.
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
2 Russian Savings Bank, one of the largest banks in Russia.
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2014: 208, 221). FDI in Brownﬁeld projects came mostly in the
form of reinvested proﬁt from joint ventures, with the total value of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) reaching just $13
mln in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014: 218). Ever-decreasing state subsidies,
no longer sustainable at their previous levels since the global
ﬁnancial crisis, remained as the main funding channel, putting
many companies on the brink of bankruptcy.
Two principal schools of interpretation of the country’s
position exist. The ﬁrst is a group of researchers which argues
for the country’s positive macro performance in relation to
Ukraine and Russia and assert its underlying resilience (Ioffe &
Yarashevich, 2011). National statistics are deployed to support
these arguments, including inter alia ﬁgures suggesting that high
levels of human capital development are present. The largest
single corpus of writing on the Belarussian economy comprises
works from this optimistic school, contending that the economy’s
fundamentals are robust (see e.g., Rudenkov, 2003; Shimov, 2009;
Dorina, 2005; Nikitenko, 2008). Optimistic authors draw exten-
sively on ofﬁcial macro-economic statistics on total FDI inﬂows.
However, most of this ‘FDI’ comprises loans from foreign partners
and reinvested proﬁt (Manenok, 2013). Belarussian ‘optimistic’
scholars have been supported by a recent positive reference made
en passant by Lin (2012: 190) regarding the country’s gradual
approach to change. Having abandoned an earlier argument that
convergence with Western coordinated market economies was
occurring (Rudenkov, 2003; Dorina, 2005), they vigorously defend
the state’s central role in the economy. These researchers claim
that Belarus has been implementing an innovation-driven,
personnel-focused solution to attracting FDI and surviving the
global crisis (Myasnikovich, 2011; Shmarlovskaya & Petrushke-
vich, 2012).
A second group is more critical and on occasions pessimistic. It
has been argued that the country is subject to an extreme form of
Burawoy’s (2001) ‘involutionary retroregression’ or the tendency
for certain post-Soviet regimes to evolve in a backward sense due
to increasing rather than decreasing state intervention. It has been
suggested that Belarus is today more economically state-dominat-
ed and politically repressive than pre-1989 (Danilovich &
Croucher, 2011). Such researchers emphasise that from the mid-
1990s, foreign competition began to bite and could not be dealt
with by price controls (Pastore & Verashchagina, 2006). A
contribution from the ‘new institutionalist’ perspective also
suggests a subtly critical view, suggesting that the country is
moving towards ‘state capitalism’; external pressures from
international sources are recognised and the lack of reference to
intermediate institutions such as trade unions to invest in training
are evident (Korosteleva, 2007). Others argue that the ﬁnancial
crisis has hit the indebted Belarussian state hard, increasing its
indebtedness, and that the Eurasian Economic Union offers few
prospects for it since its main purpose is to support Russia’s foreign
relations (Blockmans & Kostanyan, 2012).
In the context of this broad debate, we examine training at
enterprise level and the link between this and FDI, suggesting a
connection between decreasing intra-ﬁrm investment in person-
nel training and low levels of FDI attraction and retention. We
argue that underutilisation of human capital negatively affects
knowledge creation and technology adoption. We begin by
deriving research questions from various literatures. Next, our
methodology is explained, together with context-speciﬁc difﬁcul-
ties. Our core section discusses the ﬁndings from an empirical
study of personnel management practices and provides statistical
evidence of its dynamics. We then examine perceptions of
development opportunities and ﬁnish with an analysis of the
resulting changes in labour productivity and impact on FDI. We
conclude by identifying our contribution.2. Research questions
Comparable transition economies which may represent viable
alternative locations for FDI have seen increasing volumes of
training in workplaces and demonstrated a tendency for enter-
prises to take a more strategic approach to it (for Kazakhstan, see
Minbaeva, Hutchings, & Thompson, 2007). In some cases
considerable increases have been claimed in employees trained
in-house. Data from the Russian National Statistical Committee
show that the total number of employees receiving training
increased from 0.77 million people in 1995–1996 to 4.996 million
in 2010. (Russian Federal Statistical Service, 2005, 2011) The most
noticeable trend has been the increased share of skilled workers
without higher education among those trained. In-house training
directed at this category of worker jumped from approximately
5.1% in 1995–1996 to 40.7% in 2010. 83.6% of skilled workers were
trained in-house, showing that Russian enterprises are addressing
previous problems: limited ﬁnance, a shortage of skilled trainers/
mentors and the persistence of the Soviet company culture based
on information hoarding and secrecy even between departments
of the same enterprise (see, e.g., Soltitskaya & Andreeva, 2007; Tan
et al., 2007; Tsuhlo, Lazareva, & Denisova, 2006). These ofﬁcial
statistics are conﬁrmed in their broad outlines by non-ofﬁcial
sources. A comprehensive enterprise survey conducted in Russia in
2011 by the Sberbank2 Centre for Macroeconomic Studies found
that 35% of the respondent companies had increased their
investments in personnel training since the 2008–2009 crisis
compared to 17% in 2000–2008 (Ivanova & Kamenskih, 2011: 7,
18). Management training increased.
A broadly comparable upward trend was in evidence in Ukraine
prior to the crisis in relations with Russia and subsequent war.
Workforce training in Ukraine in 2011 was predominantly
conducted in-house (175.6 thousand people) as opposed to
external training (54.4 thousand people). The total number of
employees who received training in 2011 was 230.0 thousand
people, a drop in comparison to the pre-crisis year 2008 when the
total number of workers trained was 290.1 thousand people, but an
improvement compared to the crisis year 2009 when the total
number of trainees was 209.3 thousand people (,State Statistics
Service of Ukraine, 2008, 2009, 2011). There is nothing to indicate
in either the Russian or Ukrainian statistics that training is other
than directly production-related as opposed to health and safety
related as in Belarus (see below).
Internationally high levels of investment in Belarussian human
capital are cited by some authors (e.g. Ioffe & Yarashevich, 2011) as
a result of the high number of years of schooling, which places the
country, along with other post-Soviet countries, at high positions
in international league tables for human capital development
(UNDP Human Capital Report, 2011). There is therefore a sound
base for further development of human capital during working
lives (Malamud & Pop-Eleches, 2008). The question is how much
further vocational education and training is in place. We must also
consider management and worker perceptions of training and its
value. Outside of state requirements for certain very speciﬁc types
of training, there is no obvious institutional pressure for increased
training. Attitudes therefore become proportionately more impor-
tant. In Russia, it appears that these have shifted towards
emphasising the importance of workplace training, but the
Belarussian situation is unclear.
In summary, two interim conclusions inform our research
questions. First, comparable transition economies claim to have
improved the volume of production-related training aimed at
managers and skilled employees and there is some external
corroboration of these claims. Second, there are no equivalent
Table 1
Average company expenditure on training, 1996–2013 (per cent of total labour
costs).
Company type Period
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happening at enterprise level remains terra incognita. Thus, our
research questions are:
 How has the nature and volume of enterprise investments in
training evolved?
 What are managerial and employee perceptions of training and
its value?
 What FDI-related outcomes arise?
3. Method
Belarus is one of the most problematic research environments
in the world. Even those sympathetic to its government enumerate
numerous potential problems (e.g., Mandel, 2004: 213–222)). One
difﬁculty is the country‘s general socio-economic environment:
the overwhelming majority of Belarussian enterprises are (explic-
itly or implicitly) state-owned, with directors appointed by the
state.3 The system of ‘ideological control’ in enterprises has grown
much stronger (Danilovich & Croucher, 2011). Senior management
is frequently unwilling to allow social or economic research. Even
where managers decide to cooperate, it is difﬁcult to elicit answers
to direct questions in questionnaires and interviews since
researchers are regarded as accountable either to the enterprise
director or state institutions. Other problems include the limited
availability of labour market data, and the total absence of
information on government institutional control at enterprise
level. We therefore gathered data from informal interviews with
individual workers conducted outside factories.4 To collect data at
enterprises, two different permissions were sought and eventually
obtained: one from the government (via a request sent to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and another from the Regional
Executive Committee. The sample included nine large- and
medium-sized companies in the Mogilev region. Seven of these
are quasi-privatised (formally privatised but with a government
share of up to 99%) and two are state-owned. Enterprises of various
sizes and types were chosen. All had a human resources, or
personnel, department and trade unions.
Company data including ﬁgures for FDI dynamics, expenditure
on training (measured as percentage of total labour costs), level of
training (measured as the hours of training received), wage
dynamics, productivity change and career progression for trained
and untrained personnel were analysed. The data were separated
for white-collar and blue-collar managerial and non-managerial
staff, by educational background and level of job tenure.
Questionnaires were developed to cover as many labour manage-
ment issues as possible while avoiding ‘sensitive’ issues; a speciﬁc
version was developed for use with workers with relatively low
levels of education. After the second, simpler questionnaire was
introduced, response rates increased from 35% to 65.9% (2100
questionnaires were distributed, 1384 returned). As almost all
questions were answered, the amount of missing data was low and
almost entirely concerned responses that might help reveal
respondents’ identities. The problems were mitigated by having
a native Russian speaker carrying out the ﬁeldwork, a researcher
who could be seen, in the words of a manager, as ‘someone who
belongs with them and is thus capable of reading between the
lines’. A high response rate was also partially due to the use of
‘gatekeepers’ (in this case personnel inspectors) in their distribution3 The appointment of each director has to be personally approved by the
President.
4 Workers refused to talk within their work environment because they feared
persecution from management. Therefore, interviews occurred at private apart-
ments.and collection. Questionnaires were distributed among white-collar
and blue-collar non-managerial staff with different educational
backgrounds and various lengths of job tenure.
18 interviews were conducted, 9 with personnel inspectors and
9 with labour planning managers. Belarussian managers engage
more readily with direct, structured questions. Once interviews
started respondents became more relaxed and started talking
more freely, discussing issues deliberately left unmentioned by the
researchers. Predetermined questions were asked seeking their
view of labour management processes at their enterprises,
employees’ human capital, research and development (R&D)
policies and the external and internal institutional environments.
Between three and ﬁve management interviews were conducted
per enterprise, depending on its size. All interviews were
conducted person-to-person; people refused to talk on the
telephone (‘You never know who is talking to you and, more
importantly, who is listening’, as one manager said).
4. Findings
4.1. The evolution of enterprise investments in training
Training and development are much less regulated than
remuneration or dismissal. Training provision for the employed
workforce has been left, for the most part, in the hands of
enterprise management, with governmental and presidential
structures controlling only the fulﬁlment of minimal require-
ments. This has recently resulted in state-controlled companies
shrinking their training budgets to minimal levels and private
companies abandoning training altogether, to cut costs. The largest
fall, unsurprisingly, took place in the last ﬁve years when the
economy was hit by the global crisis (Table 1).
In our nine companies, employees in managerial and highly
skilled technical roles were the main recipients of work-related
training, a pattern similar to that reported for Western companies
(Blundell, Dearden, & Meghir, 1996; O’Mahony, 2012). Most
training received by blue-collar respondents was legally required
health and safety training only. 86.2% of respondents received
health and safety-related training at least once in the last ﬁve
years. Of these, 33% received it more than once. According to
personnel inspectors, their main concern is to make employees
aware of health and safety regulations as failure to do so may result
in lawsuits. Only 31% of highly educated specialists and 2.2% of
workers without higher education reported that they had been
sent to production-related courses, paid by their employers, in the
last ﬁve years. 83% of highly educated employees reported that
they received all their training (including training in production
and job-related matters) entirely by paying for it themselves.
Personnel managers admitted that the only help they are legally
obliged to give is to provide with the necessary number of days off
work during exam periods (twice a year) after receiving signed
conﬁrmation from the educational establishment. Thus, the only
guaranteed beneﬁt an employee is entitled to by law is the
extension to their annual leave by the number of days spent in
training (Article 151 of the Labour Code). The enterprise is not1996–2001 2002–2007 2008–2013
State-owned 3.7 5.2 2.2
Quasi-privatised 4.2 7.9 2.8
Private 1.8 1.4 0.2a
Source: Authors’ calculations based on company data.
aData based on one company.
6 The practice is formally allowed by the Statute on Continuous Professional
Training of Workers (and Employees) of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Belarus No. 599, (15.05.2007) and the Statute on the Process of the Certiﬁcation of
Personnel Trained in Worker Specialties under Continuous Training at Work and
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beneﬁts for these days, unless such a requirement is speciﬁed in
the collective agreement (these did not exist in the establishments
surveyed) or if the person is sent to receive the professional or the
ﬁrst higher educational qualiﬁcation by the enterprise (Articles
214–216 of the Labour Code). In the latter case, an employee is
legally entitled to receive 50% of the tariff part of their wage5
during the total length of study for full-time degree courses or a full
tariff wage for short courses. Organizations, however, ﬁnd
numerous ways to deprive workers of this right. 61% of white-
collar and 91% of blue-collar workers reported that they were
warned of the possibility of termination of their contracts when
they mentioned their desire to undertake full-time studies.
‘Haven’t they taught you anything at the university? Your diploma
says you are a specialist, so go on, work’, one of the interviewees, a
textile technology engineer was told by his manager.
91% of personnel managers admitted that companies do not
specify the provision of study/training packages in employment
contracts and do not set individual development goals even for key
employees. Workers on ﬁxed-term contracts are dismissed
towards the end of their contracts and then re-hired to avoid
any statutory requirement for training. This sometimes requires a
new job title at the same grade and pay rate. Where this cannot be
done, the employee may be trained, though in this case a personnel
inspector commonly assigns him or her to a training programme at
the last minute to save money, suggesting a ﬁnancial motive for
restricting training. As one labour planning manager said: ‘If I start
sending everyone to courses and workshops, the factory will either
go bankrupt or, more likely, I will be ﬁred. If it is absolutely
necessary to train then I will send the smartest, he will then return
and teach everyone else, so that, as they say, the wolves are fed and
the sheep are alive’. Thus, a clear distinction can be made between
formal training received by the selected few and informal training
received by many. The latter is provided in the form of mentoring
when the recipients of formal training pass on knowledge to the
rest of the working collective. This was found to be a common
money saving method of training for UK companies during the
crisis (Felstead, Green, & Jewson, 2012). There is a clear risk of
messages becoming diluted as they are passed on in abbreviated
form.
The HR manager of the state medical organisation, interviewed
separately two years after the ﬁrst round of the main study was
conducted, conﬁrmed widespread use of the training practice
whereby only one person, usually the head of the department, is
formally trained if a particular need arises (installation of new
equipment, new vaccine, etc.) while the rest receive no formal
training and are either taught by the person who attended formal
training or simply read the instructions. This does not lead to any
changes in wages or tariff grades for those concerned. Indeed, even
the small potential for attending directly production-related
training to raise earnings may be one reason for managers
avoiding providing workers with such training. Training provided
by the enterprise normally has very little effect on earnings, being
either a formality that must be fulﬁlled for legal reasons or the only
way for employees to keep their jobs. Some categories of
employees, such as accountants, personnel department specialists
or company lawyers, may not receive company paid training at all
if top management decides that they do not need it. As one
interviewee, a senior personnel inspector, reported: ‘the deputy
director said: you do not need training, this costs money, you know
everything yourself, and if you don’t know, look in the journals’.
Training is also used as a disciplinary tool. One HR manager
admitted to an informal practice at her enterprise. If senior
management wished to dismiss an employee whilst avoiding legal5 Those studying do not keep any beneﬁts, bonuses or wage premiums.action against them, they stopped sending them to formal training.
Since the employee would have broken the terms of their contract,
they could then be faced with the choice of either leaving ‘by
mutual consent’ or with dismissal for failing to fulﬁl their
obligation (Labour Code Article 42, paragraph 2).
A justiﬁcation often given by managers is the large number of
unemployed people seeking work (contrary to ofﬁcial statistics
showing unemployment at 0.4% in 2011 (Koettl, Oval, & Santos,
2011) a ﬁgure increased to 0.5% in 2013 (National Statistical
Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 2014b). As all our
respondent HR managers agreed, it is easier to get a new worker
than to train an existing one. As some of them put it: ‘there are so
many people with good workers’ qualiﬁcations out in the street
that it is cheaper just to get one from the job centre or elsewhere
than waste my time and the head of the department’s time
developing all those study programs, timetables and other stuff
just to tick the box’; ‘If I need a carpenter or a plumber to ﬁll a
vacancy, all I need to do is to whistle and I will have a queue’. As
they admitted, the easiest way to fulﬁl legal requirements is to
assign a higher razryad (work grade) on the basis of the length of
job tenure (after an exam which is a pure formality)6 which
involves a minor increase in wage (the size of increase is speciﬁed
by the Tariff and Qualiﬁcation Reference Book) which is cheaper
than providing training. One of the labour planning managers
justiﬁed the practice: ‘Look, if the man is in his job for ten years, he
knows it anyway, so this is better for everyone: we are within the
boundaries of the law, and people don’t have to travel anywhere in
the middle of the year. Everyone is at their place, everyone is
happy, no one complains, there is peace and quiet’. Nevertheless,
and despite the supply of workless people, a lack of speciﬁc
training was also admitted to be an issue in terms of up-skilling
existing workers with company-speciﬁc skills. Moreover, invest-
ments in existing personnel encourage reciprocal investments
from the personnel themselves. Solutions based on hiring
unemployed individuals are therefore only partial.
4.2. Perceptions of training and its beneﬁts
Minimal training opportunities mean poor career prospects for
most employees, unless they have connections. Some personnel
managers denied this, referring to the government requirements.
One, from a large textile enterprise, argued that their enterprise
cares greatly about employees’ chances to enhance their training
and career opportunities. According to her, the enterprise has
regular career checks and monitoring for every employee group to
ﬁnd ‘the best and the brightest’, who receive full support from
senior management. As an example she told the story of a young
woman who won the enterprise’s young talent competition for
whom the enterprise pays for a postgraduate degree in order to
keep her working for it afterwards. However, when asked about the
young woman’s other connections to the enterprise, she admitted
that the woman’s parents both work as managers (one as a senior
manager) at the same enterprise. As the manager put it, they form a
‘labour dynasty’ which, in her words, ‘shows that there is the
potential for growth for the whole family, and this is, actually, not
bad at all, shows others what they and their families can achieve
when they give their working lives to the enterprise’. The
personnel inspector of a health organisation told a story of a chief
accountant who managed ﬁrst to ‘squeeze in’ her daughter’s bestbeing Awarded Qualiﬁcations passed by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of
Belarus No. 494 (13.08.1998).
Table 2
Employee perception of their potential wage growth and career progression as a result of received training at state-owned and quasi-privatised companies (by level of
education).
Employee perception of
potential change
(percentage of
respondents)
Wage Career progression
Highly educated
(university)
Educated
(professional college)
Non-educated
(secondary school)
Highly educated
(university)
Educated
(professional college)
Non-educated
(secondary school)
Will grow/improve 13% 24% 36% 8 5 2
Will stay at its
current level
87% 76% 64% 92 95 98
Will decrease – – – – – –
Source: Authors’ calculations based on company data.
Table 3
Employees’ perception of their potential wage growth and career progression as a result of received training at state-owned and quasi-privatised companies (by length of job
tenure).
Employee perception of
potential change
(percentage of
respondents)
Wage Career progression
1–5 years 6–10 years 11–15 years Over 15 years 1–5 years 6–10 years 11–15 years Over 15 years
Will grow/improve 29 18 13 7 3 5 9 4
Will stay at its current level 71 82 87 93 97 95 91 96
Will decrease – – – – – –
Source: Authors’ calculations based on company data.
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organization (her personal friend) to pay for the young woman’s
college training, and then tried helping her prote´ge´e to receive a
higher tariff grade while she was still in training. The examples
demonstrate the powerlessness of many of those responsible for
training.
Responses from employees of different educational back-
grounds and job tenure conﬁrm the argument (Tables 2 and 3).
Incentives to train are generally low. Most employees foresee no
change in their career situation as the result of the training
received. Some, especially workers with only a few years of work
experience who have not yet reached a higher ryazryad will see
their wages rise (the average increase per ryazryad is 5–8%,
depending on the company). However, those whose work is graded
lower than the next ryazryad they get, will experience no wage
increase, since companies establish the pay grade in relation to the
job, not the worker’s grade.7
Therefore the majority of employees do not see any beneﬁt in
training and regard it as something they need to do to retain their
job. The perceived quality of training was also an issue: 84.3% of
blue-collar and 73.5% of white-collar respondents described
training they received as ‘a waste of time’. Consequently, the
highest skilled and more experienced workers are gradually lost;
our survey showed that more than two-thirds of highly skilled
workers and educated specialists at state-owned and quasi-
privatised enterprises have either already retired or will reach
ofﬁcial retirement age (55 for women and 60 for men) in the next
few years while younger workers prefer to leave and enter either
the private sector or migrate to Russia. 74% of employees under 30
(both educated specialists and skilled workers) stated in their
survey responses that they wished to leave their enterprises due
to low remuneration and poor career prospects. Our company
data suggest that the share of highly skilled employees with7 Every job and work grade is stated in the Tariff and Qualiﬁcation Reference
Book. When signing the work contract, the worker is usually told the grade of the
job he/she is hired to do and has to agree to receive pay according to this grade
regardless of the work grade/education he/she has. So, for instance if a highly
qualiﬁed electrician (grade 6, the highest possible for work specialties) is hired to
work as one but the work is graded by the company at grade 4, he will only receive
pay at grade 4, since the company does not consider his job to be worth paying at
grade 6.industry-speciﬁc human capital (graduates with specialized
university degrees and at least three years of experience), which
initially grew in 2002–2007 (due to heavy state subsidy made
possible by the ‘oil money’ received from Russia and revival of the
strict system of centralized recruitment of graduates), declined in
2008–2013 at every workplace. The smallest ‘brain drain’ was
identiﬁed at the chemical factory – an artiﬁcial ﬁbre producer
(Company 2), largely due to the highly specialized production
process which limits the ability of personnel to use their skills
elsewhere.
4.3. FDI-related outcomes
Low turnover among middle-aged and older workers combined
with the constant loss of highly skilled workers at both ends of the
age scale to increase the need for larger investments in employee
training. The situation is worsened by the broad programme of
technological modernization initiated by the Belarussian authori-
ties two years ago, which companies are, in fact, unable to
implement, since most of the workforce lacks the knowledge
needed for efﬁcient use of new equipment that companies are
compelled to buy. The consequence is low attractiveness of the
surveyed companies to foreign investors. Aggregate data for the
nine companies showed the total amount of foreign investment to
be steadily declining (from $57.52 million in 2006 to 26.71 million
in 2014).8 Only one company of the nine (the large artiﬁcial ﬁbre
producer) attracted new FDI in the last two years ($15 million)
when the state agreed to become a guarantor. For others, the
government remains the main cash donor as well as the main
controller. Recently, four of the enterprises were identiﬁed by the
Belarussian government as ‘problematic’ (i.e., lacking the ability to
produce output competitive in external markets) and ordered a
programme of ‘comprehensive modernisation’ (which does not
include additional training and/or re-training of personnel).
Previous programmes of technological modernisation completed
at four other enterprises in the sample failed to deliver tangible
improvements in output and productivity. When asked about their
results, labour planning managers admitted that they had to use8 Most foreign investment comes from Russia in the form of reinvested proﬁts
from joint projects.
H. Danilovich, R. Croucher / International Business Review 24 (2015) 966–971 971old production methods and low production quotas on new
machinery since many workers lacked the capacity to utilise it
fully.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our contribution was to show that investment in training in a
group of Belarussian companies has decreased signiﬁcantly.
Companies provide training but only sufﬁcient to comply with
government regulations. Employers are unwilling to support those
who engage in full-time study and prefer to conduct in-house
training which in many instances brings employees very little or no
beneﬁt in terms of wage growth and no visible career progression.
Rather than involving employees positively, there was evidence of
training being used as a disciplinary tool. No company viewed
training as a strategic management concern, which, combined with
the cost-saving motive, resulted in the prevalence of a semi-
informal mode of training: mentoring schemes, which may
superﬁcially appear to demonstrate loosening of the Soviet-style
state system of control but are in fact a pragmatic response which
leaves some machinery used at less than full capacity.
We therefore suggest that the more positive or optimistic group
of researchers has reached conclusions that appear questionable
when viewed from the enterprise. Trends towards increasing
involution and state control have reached the point at which they
are denying sufﬁcient space for managers, intrapreneurs and norm
entrepreneurs to innovate at company level. The relative open-
ness of the Belarussian economy to external ﬁnancial markets
rapidly feeds through in crisis to reduced training and, in turn, to a
long-term reduction in the country’s ability both to maximise
labour inputs and attract FDI. Through this negative dynamic the
economy is becoming more sealed off from external inﬂuence and
innovation. This variant of the transitional periphery model may
therefore be becoming unsustainable in the long term; the central
underlying cause appears to be the sharpening contradiction
between growing state control of industry and its reduced capacity
to subsidise it.
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